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Steam Railroads
Despite some use of electric traction and the recent adoption of
Diesel power on a fairly large scale, all rail carriers —exceptonly
wholly electrified local systemsarestill officially described as
'steam railroads'. This usage will be followed here.
Steam railroads move more than half the passenger and nearly
two-thirds of the freight traffic carried by. intercity transportation
agencies. Of two million transportation workers within the United
States and on ocean-borne American-flag vessels, about half are
employed by our railroads.
Relatively speaking the railroads are old, for among forms of
carriage considered in this book only waterways have a longer
history. Moreover, railroads are distinguished from all other trans-
portation agencies in that they constitute, from the physical and
traffic standpoints, a unified system. Although operated by several
hundred distinct companies, they have long enjoyed standard
track and loading gauges, interchangeable locomotives and cars,
and uniform couplers and air brakes. From the traffic viewpoint,
joint rates and through routes allow passenger travel and freight
shipments from one end of the country to the other.
Our definition of the steam railway industry includes the line-
haul roads, the switching and terminal companies, the Pullman
Company, and the Railway Express Agency or its predecessor
companies.' Since 1911 the ICC has classified line-haul com-
panies on the basis of operating revenues, those of class I having
annual revenues above $1,000,000, class II above $100,000 but
Excluded activities which might possibly be considered part of the industry
are buslines owned by railroads and freight-forwarding concerns. The former
are here considered part of the bus industry; data on the latter are scanty.
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below $1,000,000, and class III below $100,000.2 Line-haul
carriers provide most of the switching and terminal services
required by their operations; the remainder is furnished by spe-
cialized switching and terminal companies.3 The functions of the
Pullman Company and the Railway Express Agency are familiar.
In 1939 line-haul companies constituted more than nine-tenths
of the entire steam railroad industry (Table 15).
Table 15












All line haul companies 4,050 93.9 1,007 90.5
Class I 3,995 92.6 988 88.8
Class II 47 1.1 15 1.4
Class III 8 0.2 4 0.3
Switching & terminal companies 90 2.1 42 3.8
Class I 61 1.4 30 2.7
Class II and III 29 0.7 12 1.1
Pullman Company 61 1.4 21 1.9
Railway Express Agency 112 2.6 42 3.8
TOTAL, ALL COMPANIES 4,313 100.0 1,112 100.0
Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics of Railways in the United States,
1939.
THE CONCEPT OF PHYSICAL OUTPUT
The output of any industry, with minor exceptions, is sold on thc
market. By appealing to the judgment of the market place we can
combine the outputs of different commodities (or units of trans-
2Therelative importance of class I line-haul carriers has slightly expanded
since 1911, in which year they contributed 96.5 percent of the operating
revenues of all line-haul companies; corresponding percentages were 98.6 for
1939 and 98.8 for 1946. Any index of output based on class I statistics, as ours
must be in some years of the period, therefore requires a small adjustment to
eliminate a slight upward bias.
Switching and terminal companies may also operate bridges and ferries and
transport regular freight and passenger traffic, although such activity on their
part is small.STEAM RAILROADS 65
portation service, as in the present instance) in a reasonably
unambiguous fashion. We add apples and oranges by summing
their values in constant prices; that is, by valuing physical quanti-
ties in terms of a system of prices derived from the market place.
The prices chosen are constant in the sense that their time refer-
ence is the same, not only for all commodities in the summation,
but for output at all dates for which any given comparison is
made. The time reference in question is called the 'weight base',
and may be a single year or group of years. In this study within
the railroad industry we have used the Edgeworth formula, which
rests on the average price of the commodity (e.g., average reve-
nue per passenger-mile) for each pair of years considered. In
combining the outputs of the various transportation industries we
have used 1939 weights.
So long as we are willing to accept its judgments, the
phenomena of the market place also afford criteria for testing
the adequacy of any unit, or system of units, we may select for
measuring the output of a single commodity.4 It is convenient
to regard amounts of output, produced simultaneously, as equiva-
lent to each other when the value the market sets upon them is
the same. A simple extension of this notion leads to the require-
ment that the physical unit we choose, in measuring output from
one period to another, shall satisfy the following condition:
namely, that quantities of output measured in terms of this unit
shall, at any given moment, be proportional to the money values
assigned to them by the market. The use of this criterion of course
leads to results that are a function of the institutional character
of the market itself. For instanc'e, where the price of output is
administered, or where monopoly conditions prevail, the result
may be quite different from that under conditions of perfect com-
petition. We have no certain knowledge as to how price and out-
put would behave if the character of the market were different
IIfno system of units will satisfy the test to be proposed, we arc
bound to regard the output in question not as a single commodity but as a
group of distinct commodities. If the classification is sufficiently fine, we can
presumably always find units that meet the test: in that case the problem is
reduced to one of the availability of statistical detail and of the patience of
the computer.—
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from what it is: consequently the criterion just outlined appears
to furnish the sole objective basis available for distinguishing
between different possible physical units of measurement.
The strict application of this principle would force us to take
full account of product differentiation wherever the latter gives
rise to price differentials. Not only variations in quality, but
quantity discounts, and varying conditions of service or delivery,
would force us to classify as separate commodities portions of
output that are otherwise similar. However, in the case of most
concrete goods it is not hard to find an attribute, such as weight
or volume, for which the condition indicated —aproportional
relationship between quantity and value —isapproximately ful-
filled. In considering the output of services, it is often much more
difficult to find a satisfactory unit. The product is intangible; and
peculiarities of pricing may cast doubt upon procedures that in
other industries would appear acceptable. In particular, trans-
portation services are sold in a market that, although somewhat
more competitive than it once was, is still highly monopolistic at
some points, and in which prices are frequently settled by fiat.
Theuse of such prices for weighting an index of transportation
output, as in this book, perhaps needs explicit justification. The
points at issue are discussed at greater length in Appendix A.
The units of passenger and freight output adopted here are the
passenger-mile and ton-mile respectively. In the case of passenger
traffic we are comparatively fortunate. For years since 1922 the
available statistics allow us to divide the sum total of passenger-
miles among (1) parlor and sleeping car, (2) coach (noncom-
mutation), and (3) commutation traffic. For any given year
revenues per passenger-mile differ sharply between these three
classes, but within each are practically constant and do not
depend on length of journey.5 Accordingly, we have constructed
our index of output for passenger transportation by combining
the three passenger-mile series mentioned, using, revenues per
passenger-mile as weights.
However, since 1932 coach passengers have paid lower rates in the south than
elsewhere, and reductions for round-trip tickets have been instituted in many
parts of the country. Some traffic also moves at tourist or excursion rates.STEAM RAILROADS 67
Inthe caseoffreighttraffic the situation is much less favorable.
Exceptfor the isolated year 1932, we have no breakdown of ton-
miles, by revenue per ton-mile or by commodity. The statistics
treat a ton of fresh vegetables shipped a hundred miles as the
equivalent of a ton of coal shipped a like distance. Yet we know
that fresh vegetables earn a higher revenue per ton-mile than
coal. Equally the summation of ton-miles gives to a single ton
carried a hundred miles the same significance as a hundred tons
carried one mile, although revenue per ton-mile is commonly
lower for long than for short hauls. Evidently two quanta of
transportation, each comprising one hundred ton-miles, may sell
for widely differing prices. No definite, least of all any propor-
tional, relationship exists between the amountoutput and its
value. This difficulty could be overcome only through the use of
ton-mile figures classified simultaneously by commodity and by
length of haul, but no such statistics exist.6
This deficiency in the ton-mile suggested the possible use of
the ton originated(i.e., shipped)as an alternative unit for'
measuring freight traffic. Unlike ton-miles, tons originated (and
revenue per ton originated) are available by individual commodi-
ties. In using these data, therefore, it would be possible to take
account of differences in rate per ton-mile and length of haul
between commodities. On the other hand, an index based on ton-
nage originated can pay no attention to changes inthe length of
haul—asubstantial factor. Forthis reason we rejected tons origi-
nated as a basic measure of freight output. We preferred to base our
measures on a summation of (unweighted) ton-miles, making
subsidiary calculations to suggest the bias introduced by the lack
of an appropriate weighting system.7 In these calculations it is
shown, for example, that on plausible assumptions —our
(unweighted) ton-mile index understates by some 5 to 10 percent
the decline in freight traffic between 1919 and 1939 that would
°Theerror introduced into our index of freight traffic by our failure to dis-
criminate between groups of commodities can be estimated, granted certain
assumptions; see Appendix C.
Still another alternative might possibly be deflation of freight revenue by an
index of freight rates; however the worth of the result would be difficult to
appraise.68 CHAPTER 4
be reported by an appropriately weighted index, i.e. the un-
weighted index has an upward bias during the years indicated.8
We turn now to the actual indexes, first for passenger traffic,
then for freight traffic, and finally for railroad transportation as
a whole.
PASSENGERTRAFFIC
Railwaypassenger traffic falls into three well defined categories:
(1) commutation, (2) other coach, and (3) parlor and sleeping
car service. Commutation traffic is the smallest of the three, con-
tributing less than 18 percent of passenger-mileage and only 9
percent of passenger revenue in 1939. Coach travel is quanti-
tatively the largest, making up about one-half of total passenger-
miles in 1939; its revenue contribution, however, was somewhat
less than that of parlor and sleeping car service, which accounted
for nearly half of the revenue total but only one-third of total
passenger-miles (Table 16).
Table 16







(mu.) (bil.) ($ mu.)(cents)
Commutation 231 4.01 41 1.02
Coach (otherthancommutation)200 11.12 200 1.80
Parlor and sleeping car 20 7.53 224 2.98
TOTAL 451 22.66 465 2.05
Statistics of Railways; see also Appendix Table B-3. Figures relate to class I
roads only. Parlor and sleeping car revenue includes Pullman charges.
The index of passenger traffic (Table 17 and Chart 10) is con-
structed inthree segments. For years after 1922 it employs the
tri-partite division just noted. For 19 11-22 it is based on a simple
division between coach (including commutation) traffic on the
8Thechoice between ton-miles and tons originated as a basis for the measure-
ment of freight traffic is explored more fully in Appendix C, where the calcu-
lations mentioned are given in detail.STEAM RAILROADS 69
one hand, and parlor and sleeping car traffic on the other. Prior
to 1911 the index represents unweighted passenger-miles. The
differencein movement between weighted and unweighted
indexes, for the period for which both can be computed, is slight.
Trends in Passenger Traffic
Rail passenger traffic reached peak levels in 1919 and 1920—
levels which were not surpassed until World War II (Chart 10).
The movement over the five decades 1889-1939 suggests a rather
clear case of retardation in growth. Indeed an upward trend prior
to World War I seems to have given place to a downward trend
during the interwar period. The significance of the change in trend
which occurred about 1920 is clear enough. During World War I
production first attained a really large scale.9 Not
until the war was over did the full impact of the private auto-
mobile and the unfolding public highway network make itself
felt.10 Once wartime shortages were safely in the past, and the
brief but sharp business collapse of 1920-21 had been surmounted,
the private passenger automobile quickly became the chief com-
petitor of rail passenger service. Nor must we overlook the motor-
bus and the airplane. Buslines, which had hastened the decline of
electric railways, came in the 1920's to compete with rail coach
traffic, as their range of operations widened. Finally, commercial
airlines, whose seeds were to be found in the expansion of aviation
during World War I, emerged in the 1930's as a competitor of
rail parlor and sleeping car traffic. Some of these rival transport
agencies will be considered in later chapters.
Against this background, the vast expansion of passenger traffic
during World War II may be viewed as a partial and temporary
return to an earlier output trend —thetrend which had prevailed
before World War I. During 1942-46 private automobile travel
was severely restricted by rubber and shortages; and the
expansion of intercity buses and commercial airlines was checked.
As a result, the smaller railroad mileage of 1944 carried far more
Almost 2 million cars and trucks were produced in 1917, about ten times as
many as in 1910.
SeeJoseph L. White, Transportation and Defense (University of Pennsyl-
vania Press, 1941), p. 21.70 CHAPTER 4
Table17
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1890 50.4 22.7 27.1 1920 207 123.4 136.7
1891 54.9 24.5 29.3 1921 164.2 92.3 103.9
1892 56.5 26.5 31.3 1922 157.9 102.0 110.8
1893 59.9 28,1 33.2 1923 169.9 124.1 131.0
1894 60.1 24.2 29.8 1924 161.4 116.9 123.6
1895 51.8 25.9 30.1 1925 161.3 124.5 129.9
1896 55.3 29.0 33.3 1926159.6 133.4 136.9
1897 52.0 28.8 32.6 1927 150.7 128.8 131.5
1898 56.6 34.6 38.3 1928 141.3 130.0 131.2
1899 61.6 37.5 41.6 1929 138.2 134.2 133.7
1900 67.6 42.8 47.0 1930117.8 115.0 114.6
1901 73.0 44.3 49.2 1931 94.3 92.8 92.5
1902 82.8 47.4 53.3 1932 71.1 70.2 70.0
1903 88.0 52.1 58.2 1933 69.2 74.7 73.6
1904 92.7 52.6 59.3 1934 77.8 80.6 79.8
1905 100.8 56.3 63.7 1935 80.3 84.6 83.7
1906 106.6 65.2 72.2 1936 98.2 101.7 100.9
1907 117.3 71.4 79.2 1937 108.7 108.2 108.1
1908 122.6 65.3 74.8 1938 95.5 87.0 88.1
1909 122.5 65.4 74.8 1939 100.0 100.0 100.0
1910 136.0 76.1 86.1 1940103.6 111.9 111.0
1911 139.6 75.7 86.3 1941 129.5 142.4 140.5
1912 139.8 78.7 88.9 1942 243 191.1 195.4
1913 146.2 90.0 99.0 1943 390 218 236
1914 149.2 86.1 96.1 1944 425 221 244
1915 138.1 82.6 91.3 1945 409 204 229
1916 146.6 102.4 109.1 1946 288 177.4 192.9
Calendar
Year
1916 151.1 109.2 115.4
1917 172.7 118.8 127.2
1918 184.4 121.9 131.0
1919 204 109.5 124.1
'Based on datain Appendix B. The freight index represents unweighted ton-
miles on class I, II and III roads. For 1890-1911 the passenger index represents
unweighted passenger-miles on class I, II and III roads. For 1911-46 the pas-
senger index shows weighted passenger-miles on class I roads and the Pullman
Company. Wherever two or more series are combined, the Edgeworth method
was used (i.e., weights are average unit revenues for each pair of years com-
pared). For any segment, the'terminal years were compared, and the results
of year-to-year comparisons were adjusted to the terminal year comparison by
distributing of the small discrepancy. In constructing the passenger index
1911-22, 1922-29 and 1929-39 were treated as such segments. (Thus theSTEAM RAILROADS 71
comparison between 1922 and 1931 involves three Edgeworth comparisons:
1922-29, 1929-30 and 1930-31, the two latter including the small adjustment
mentioned.) The passenger index prior to 1911 and the freight index through-
out are simple aggregates. The passenger and freight indexes were combined
using segments; 1890-99, 1899-1909, 1909-19, 1919-29, 1929-39. Comparisons
for years after 1939 use 1939 unit revenues as weights (Laspeyres' index). In
order to include uniformly all line haul, and switching and terminal companies,
the Pullman Company and the express companies, the index was multiplied by
an index of coverage (which varied only slightly from 100 percent) based on
the ratio of operating revenues of all companies to revenues of companies
included in the index before adjustment for coverage.
traffic than moved in 1920. Indeed growth of railroad passenger
traffic between 1920 and 1944 (omitting the intervening years)
was almost as rapid as it had been before 1920 (Chart 10). The
practical cessation of growth after 1920 in peacetime passenger
traffic must evidently be attributed mainly to the rise of newer
modes of travel.
No breakdown of passenger traffic is available for the first
decade of the century, but it is likely that all classes of traffic
shared in the general expansion. At the turn of the century fears
had indeed been expressed that the rapid rise of the electric rail-
way might retard the future expansion of the passenger traffic of
steam railroads; the difficulties of the rail passenger service in the
previous decade when, especially in the 1893-97 depression, pas-
senger-mileage declined sharply, had been attributed to this
factor.1' However, with the purchase of new equipment and the
electrification of suburban trackage, the railroads, successfully met
what proved to be but the first of several new competitive threats.
Commutation traffic was first reported separately from other
coach traffic in 1922, when it amounted to 6 billion —orabout
one-sixth of total —passenger-miles(Chart 11). It rose mod-
erately throughout the 'twenties to nearly 7 billion passenger-
miles in 1929; meanwhile other coach traffic was already declin-
ing rather sharply.
Coach travel (other than commutation) fell nearly 7 billion
See Statistics of Railways, 1897, p. 61, and 1898, p. 68. On the effects of
electric railway competition, see also Thomas Conway, Jr., 'Traffic Problems
of Interurban Electric Railroads', Journal of Accountancy, Oct. 1908, pp.
427-8; and Edward S. Mason, The Street Railway in Massachusetts (Harvard
University Press, 1932), pp. 63-4.Chart 10
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the same in 1939 as in 1929. It is plain that the private auto-
mobile, furnishing several hundred billion passenger-miles of travel
annually, has mainly called forth 'new business' which never could
have moved by rail. Doubtless a substantial part of intercity bus
travel (10 billion passenger-miles in 1939) consists of coach traffic
lost by the railroads, but it too must have reached layers of demand
not tapped by
Chart11
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predominantly encouraged travel which the railroads could not
or would not develop, it seems certain that the cessation of growth
in railroad coach travel must be attributed to the automobile and
intercity busline.
Small amounts of Pullman traffic, which quantitatively had.
begun to outrank coach by 1929, were lost to the commercial air-
lines during the 1930's. Yet in 1939 airlines still accounted for well
under a billion passenger-miles, although rail Pullman service had
apparently lost six or seven times that amount of traffic during the
decade. Obviously the privately owned passenger car had become
the dominant factor in intercity travel, both for commercial and
domestic purposes; moreover intercity bus transportation was
now a substantial factor in the picture. Most of the diversion of
traffic from the railroads to the airlines has occurred during and
since World War II.
Before leaving the subject, we may note changes in the length
of the average rail journey. These changes suggest that, at least up
to 1939, the railroads chiefly lost short-haul traffic. Thus the
average journey per passenger increased from 28 miles in 1899 to
50 in 1939, a gain of nearly 80 percent. Since 1922 passengers in
the three groups have traveled the average distances in the accom-
panying table.
Of the entire increase in length of journey since 1899 some part
may reflect settlement of the Pacific Coast and the continued
growth of transcontinental travel. Since 1922 commuters may




Commutation 14.3 15.1 17.4 22
Other coach 35.7 40.2 55.6 56
Parlor and sleeping car 259 288 379 45
'The Pullman Company reports a considerably longer journey than that
shown here for parlor and sleeping car passengers (e.g., 542 miles in 1939)
because its figures relate to the purchase of accommodations for an entire trip,
regardless of the number of separate railroad companies involved. The figures
quoted here refer to the average journey over any single railroad. The reported
increases in length of journey, therefore, reflect railroad consolidation, but the
effect has been minor.0
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Yet it seems plain that the growth of the average length of the
rail journey mainly reflects greater diversion to other agencies of
short than of long distance traffic.
To summarize: railroad passenger traffic reached a peak in
19 19-20, a peak surpassed only by the rush of business during
World War II. During the 1920's regular-fare coach traffic
declined rapidly but commutation and parlor and sleeping car
traffic remained remarkably stable. Although all forms of traffic
fell off during the depression, coach traffic suffered no further net
decline during the 1930's. But commutation traffic did not
recover from depression levels, and parlor and sleeping car traffic
also stood lower in 1939 than in 1929. Because of loss of short
haul traffic, and for other reasons, the average journey steadily
lengthened.
FREIGHT TRAFFIC
The ideal measure of freight traffic would involve a summation of
shipments (i.e., tons originated), each shipment being weighted
by the revenue it earned during some base period. That is, all
shipments of commodity A between points X and Y (or, less accur-
ately, all shipments of commodity A with a specified length of
haul) —butno larger aggregate —shouldbe treated as homo-
geneous. The resulting total (whether of tons or ton-miles is
unimportant) would then be weighted by its average revenue in
the base period. This is a counsel of perfection. Shipments are not
classified by length of haul; and —exceptfor the isolated (and
atypical) year 1932 —nodivision of the ton-mile aggregate by
commodities is available. Yet if we wish to allow for changes in
length of haul —andthere is ample evidence that hauls are longer
than they used to be —thenwe must use the ton-mile as our
unit, despite the fact that we have no means of segregating high
revenue from low revenue ton-miles. Accordingly, our basic index
for railroad freight traffic is a simple (unweighted) ton-mile aggre-
gate. (Tables 17 and 18 and Chart 12.) Unlike passenger traffic,
which reached a peak in 19 19-20 and then declined, freight traffic
continued to grow, reaching its pre-1940 peak in 1929. Between
1889 and 1929 rose not quite sixfold, declined some76 CHAPTER4
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1899 27.5 35.3 37.8
1900 31.4 41.1 43.0
1901 32.7 41.1 43.4
1902 34.9 46.3 48.4
1903 38.5 50.4 53.5
1904 38.8 50.3 53.4
1905 41.4 55.3 57.1
1906 47.9 63.1 64.9
1907 52.5 68.9 70.3
1908 48.5 61.3 61.6
1909 48.6 62.1 62.6
1910 56.6 72.3 71.3
1911 56.4 70.7 71.9
1912 58.7 72,7 73.9
1913 67.0 83.3 84.1
1914 64.1 79.6 80.2
1915 61.6 72.1 76.5
1916 76.3 89.0 91.2
Calendar
Year
1916 81.3 92.8 95.0
1917 88.5 97.4 97.7
1918 90.8 97.0 97.8
1919 81.6 83.8 89.0
1920 91.9 96.0 97.1
1921 68.8 71.7 75.3
1922 76.0 78.3 83.0
1923 92.5 97.8 97.5
1924 87.1 90.7 92.5
1925 92.7 95.2 96.2
1926 99.4 101.4 100.2
1927 96.0 .96,7 96.2
1928 96.9 96.6 97.4











1930 85.7 86.0 85.2
1931 69.1 66.6 68.2
1932 52.3 47.8 50.6
1933 55.7 51.7 53.2
1934 • 60.0 56.5 57.9
1935 63.0 58.6 59.9
1936 75.8 71.3 70.9
1937 80.6 75.8 74.9
1938 64.8 57.8 60.0
1939 74.5 67.3 67.5
1940 83.4 75.3 73.4
"Data from Statistics of Railways; see Appendix Table B-I. Index covers
class I, II, and III line-haul companies for 1907-39; and the same, together
with switching and terminal companies, for 1890-1907. This index is the same
as that shown in Table 17, except that data have not been adjusted for coverage
prior to 1911.
Data from Statistics of Railways; not available prior to 1899. Index covers
class 1, Il, and III line-haul companies; for 1899-1907, some small amounts
of tonnage originating on switching and terminal companies may be included,
but no adjustment was possible on this account.
°Datafrom Statistics of Railways; not available prior to 1899. Index is based
on commodity breakdown for class I traffic, as follows; 6 classes, 1899-1924;
66 classes, 1924-28; 157 classes, 1928-40. Comparisons used revenues per
originating ton as follows:1899-1928, 1928; 1928-29, average 1928 and
1929; 1929-40, average 1929 and 1937. Revenue data were used to adjust
the index to include traffic on class II and III roads, the assumption being
that the ratio of revenue per ton on class I to revenue per ton on class II and
III roads did not alter.
25 percent on balance between 1929 and 1939, then more than
doubled during World War II.
Trends in Freight Traffic
Although for the reason indicated the ton-mile aggregate will be
treated as basic, indexes derived from tons originated are also
shown (Table 18). The latter appear to be biased downward,
since they do not take account of the lengthening average haul.
Thus over the period 1899-1939 the average annual increase is
only 1.6 percent for tons originated but 2.3 percent for ton-miles.
In discussing the changing composition of railroad freight traffic,
we shall have to use originating tonnage series and bear this
bias in mind.
It is obvious that freight traffic, like passenger traffic, has been78 CHAPTER 4
subject to marked retardation of growth, at least over the period
1889-1939 (Chart 10).
The substantial advance of railroad ton-mileage in the first two
decades of the century accompanied the expansion of the national
market. The railroad network, now approaching completion,
served to connect manufacturing centers with the source of raw
materials, and urban consumers with areas of food supply. The
pre-Worid War I era was generally characterized by a business
optimism engendered by a steadily rising commodity price level,
increasing industrial and agricultural production, and the opening
of new markets at home and abroad. In this era, the railroads
enjoyed an unchallenged position in the country's transportation
system. Preceding decades had seen the virtual supersession of
rivers and canals by the railroad, while mechanical highway trans-
portation was still in its infancy.
Already evidence of the railroad industry's maturity was to be
found in the falling off in the construction of new lines. Total rail
mileage under operation (excluding switching and terminal com-
panies) stood at 188,000 in 1899 and rose at an average annual
rate of 2 percent to a peak in 1916; thereafter it maintained itself
at a level of 260,000 until 1930, when an average annual decline
of one-half percent set in. During the period after 1916, the small
construction of new lines balanced the abandonment of unprofit-
able lines. The construction of additional trackage and sidings
continued throughout .the 'twenties, although this too declined
after 1930. Railroad investment in the period under review tended
more and more toward amplification rather than extension of the
existing network.
Yet during World War lithe railroads carried more freight
traffic than ever before. As in the case of passenger traffic, though
in lesser degree, we may regard the wartime peak in freight traffic
as a partial and temporary return to a previous trend. The practi-
cal cessation of growth of freight traffic after 1920 (the peak did
not actually come till 1929) is not due to any single factor: the
growth of motor trucking and pipelines played a part; so did the
bulk transportation by water of such products as petroleum.STEAMRAILROADS 79
Chart 12
RAILROAD FREIGHT TRAFFIC:
TONS ORIGINATED AND TON-MILES
of tons originated
1,600
The preceding remarks are based upon the movement of the
(unweighted) ton-mileage aggregate which, as already explained,
is our basic measure. Data for the computation of a weighted ton-
mile index do not exist. Yet we still can inquire how our unweighted
index would be modified, were we able to weight each ton-mile
by its revenue in constant prices
The Federal Coordinator of Transportation
by commodities of the entire carload ton-mileage
total for 1932. A summary of this breakdown (Table 19) shows
DuringWorld War II trucking andcoastwise shipping were
sharplyinhibited. As a resultfreight trafficin 1944 approached,





















considerable dispersion among mean revenues per ton-mile for
different commodities.'2 The existence. of this dispersion makes for
the possibility that a weighted ton-mile index would show a differ-
ent result from that indicated by the unweighted index. In fact,
the railroads have lost to competitors especially less-than-carload
and other freight customarily moving at a rather high rate per
ton-mile. Such reasoning suggests that a weighted index would
rise less rapidly, or decline more rapidly, than the (unweighted)
ton-mile index shown in Tables 17 and 18.
Table 19
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0.5 to 1.0 108,977 44.9
1.Otol.5 84,713 37.2
1.5 to 2.0 23,468 10.3
2.Oto2.5 3,129 1.4
2.5 to 3.0 52
C
3.Oto3.5 0 0
3.5 to 4.0 7,239b 3.2
TOTAL 227,578 100.0
a SeeAppendix Table C-2; for coverage of data, see note a to Appendix Table
C-i. Based on a distribution by commodities; since all traflic for each com-
modity was assigned the average revenue per ton-mile for that commodity, a
somewhat different distribution would result from a classification of individual
shipments by revenue per ton-mile.
bIncludes6,590 million ton-miles of less-than-carload freight.
Less than 0.05.
Another unit which provides an alternative measure of freight
traffic volume is the ton originated, or ton of traffic shipped by
rail. Available for years since 1899, the total number of tons
originated is represented by the index in the second column of
12The tabulations published by the Federal Coordinator do not tell us anything
about the corresponding dispersion for a single commodity, occasioned by the
varying length of haul among shipments of that commodity. But even a slight
acquaintance with rate scales suggests that this dispersion, too, must be
considerable. -STEAM RAILROADS 8t
Table 18. It is obvious on casual inspection that this index does not
rise as rapidly between 1899 and 1929 as our ton-mileage total,
and that between 1929 and 1940 it declines further than does the
latter. The evidence shows that the average haul, which can be
calculated by dividing ton-miles by tons originated, increased
rather steadily, at least during the first four decades of the present
century. Whether this trend reflects a general lengthening of the
distance individual commodities are hauled, or a shift from short
haul to long haul commodities, we shall inquire presently.
Table 20
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0 to 200 159,628 24.9
200to400 333,080 51.9
400 to 600 102,060b 15.9
600 to 800 28,938 4.5
800 to 1,000 7,462 1.2
1,000 to 1,200 3,342 .5
. 1,200tol,400 1,115 .2
1,400 to 1,600 194
c
1,600to 1,800 458 .1
1,8Q0 to 2,000 273 °
2,000 to 2,200 3,470 .5
2,200 to 2,400 225
C
2,400 to 2,600 948 .1
TOTAL 641,193 100.0
Computed from Appendix Table C-i; for coverage of data see note a to that
table. Based on a distribution by commodities; since all traffic for each com-
modity was assigned the average length of haul for that commodity, a some-
what different distribution would result from a classification of individual ship-
ments by length of haul.
Includes 15,115 th. tons of less-than-carload freight.
Less than 0.05.
Unlike the ton-mileage total, which cannot be broken down
except for the single year 1932, the number of tons originated is
distributed each year among commodities transported. The classi-
fication has gradually become more detailed, and in 1928 extended82 CHAPTER 4
to 157 commodity groups. Using these data to weight tons origi-
nated by the revenue received per ton, we can allow for differences
between one commodity and another, not only in rate per ton-
mile, but also in length.of haul. (Some idea of the dispersion of the
latter may be gained from Table 20). For most years the weighted
index constructed in this manner differs only slightly from the
corresponding unweighted index (Table 18). This is not altogether
surprising, for the composition of traffic, at least by broad com-
modity classes, has not changed greatly during our period (Chart
13). Moreover, although it takes some account of variations in the
relative importance of short and long haul commodities, the
weighted originated-ton index makes no more allowance for
changes in the length of haul of individual commodities than does
the corresponding unweighted index. Like that index, it shows a
downward movement in relation to the ton-mile index.
The Composition of Freight Traffic
Just as we can think of the growth or contraction of railroad
freight traffic in terms either of ton-miles or of tonnage originated,
so the same choice is open to us in appraising its composition. How-
ever, 1932 is the only year for which we can compare the two
classifications (Table 21)
Thefirst four classes listed —Productsof Agriculture, Animals
and Products, Products of Mines, and Products of Forests —
includemany raw or unprocessed commodities, although there
also appear such processed goods as flour and other mill products,
18Identifiedwith the nadir of the depression, 1932 was in many respects an
unrepresentative year. Thus the relative importance of farm products was
greater, and of forest products and manufactures was less, in 1932 than in other
years. This maybe seen if the distribution of tonnage originated for 1932 (see





Products of Agriculture 13.0 10.1
Animals and Products 2.8 2.1
Products of Mines 55.1 55.8
Forest Products 4.3 5.5
Manufactures and Miscellaneous 22.5 24.3
Less-than-carload 2.4 2.2STEAM RAILROADS 83
Table 21
















Products 18 2.8 11.4 5.0 191 7.51.68625
Products of
Mines 35355.1 98.743.4 73228.9 .74279
Forest Products27 4.3 12.4 5.5 108 4.3 .87455
Manufactures .
and Misc. 14422.5 55.424.4 76830.41.39385
Less-than-
carload 15 2.4 6.6 2.9 251 9.93.81436
TOTAL 641100.0227.6100.02,529100.0 1.11355
• See Appendix Table C-I; for coverage of data, see note a to that table.
leather, meats and lumber products. By contrast, Manufactures
and Miscellaneous and Less-than-carload freight are predomi-
nantly fabricated, although unprocessed items such as cotton
sometimes fall in the latter category. The distinction between iow-
and high-grade traffic is somewhat less clear. In the sense that the
revenue per ton-mile obtained from their transportation is relatively
low, minerals and forest products, and to some degree farm prod-
ucts, can be called low-grade traffic. On the other hand live
animals, many manufactures, and less-than-carload freight move
at a relatively high rate per ton-mile. Judged by this standard, the
lowest-grade traffic —bituminouscoal, metallic ores, flour and
meal14 —yields0.6 or 0.7 cents a ton-mile. The highest grade of
freight consists of manufactures or of less-than-carload traffic:
for instance, furniture, 2.4 cents; trucks, 2.8 cents; automobiles,
3.7 cents; explosives, 3.8 cents; and all less-than-carload traffic,
3.8 cents a ton-mile.15
14However,the haul of flour and meal is artificially lowered by the existence of
in-transit privileges.
15SeeAppendix Table C-i. Unfortunately less-than-carload traffic cannot be
classified by commodities even for the year 1932.Chart 13
STEAM RAILROADS:

















Agricultural and Animal Products
20
10
1919 1929 1946STEAM RAILROADS 85
The distribution of traffic among the six classes of commodities
shown in Table 21 differs markedly according to the criterion
employed. Thus in terms of tonnage originated —i.e.,amount of
freight shipped —mineralscontributed over half total freight
traffic. But their haul tends to be short: under 300 miles on the
average, compared with 355 miles for all commodities. Hence
minerals contributed a much smaller fraction of total ton-miles.
than of tons originated. Since their revenue per ton-mile is also
low, their contribution to total freight revenue is still smaller. For
opposite reasons animals and animal products and less-than-car-
load freight —bothless important than minerals by every criterion
contributea larger fraction of revenue than of ton-miles, and a
larger fraction of ton-miles than of tonnage originated.
How have the relative importance of these six broad commodity
groups varied over time? Such a detailed analysis as that given for
1932 is possible for no other year. Nevertheless, we can compute
the percentage contributions of different groups to tonnage origi-
nated for the period since 1899•1G It will be seen from Chart 13
that changes have not been striking and that the nation's mines
and quarries have for long been the most important source of
railroad shipments. The products of American farms, mines and
forests have apparently always constituted more than two-thirds
of all tonnage shipped by rail, and at the beginning of our period
comprised more than three-quarters of the total. On the whole
the shares of forest products and of less-than-carload freight have
declined, and the share of manufactures and miscellaneous has
increased. The relative decline in the movement of lumber, and
the increasing importance of manufactures doubtless reflect shifts
visible elsewhere in the nation's domestic production and foreign
commerce, shifts from primary production toward fabrication. In
the lumber, too, the rise of production in the Pacific North-
west and the opening of the Panama Canal allowed movement by
Thepercentages for the years prior to 1918 may be subject to some slight
error because of fluctuations in coverage. In 1899 only 88 percent of total
tonnage originated was distributed into commodity groups, although the pro-
portion rose to 96 percent in 1911 for all operating roads. Data for years after
1911 relate to class I roads only, and for this group coverage rose from 96
percent in 1911 to 100 percent in 1917 and later years.86 CHAPTER 4
water. However, agricultural products have pretty well maintained
their relative position. The decline in less-than-carload traffic dates
only from 1921, and is clearly associated with the rise of motor
trucking. Some decline in the animals group is also apparent in
recent years, and this, too, must be attributed to diversion to high-
way transport, rather than —aswith lumber —adecline in the
importance of the commodity in the transportation picture as a
whole.
Length of Haul
As we have seen, the unit of output adopted here for the measure-
ment of freight transportation —theton-mile —isa resultant of
the amount of tonnage offered to the rails by shippers and the
length of haul associated with each shipment of goods; thus, ton-
nage shipped being given, changes in the average length of haul
have a significant effect on trends in rail output.'7
The average haul for a ton of freight increased, for all steam
railroads, from 247 miles in 1899 to 351 miles in 1939, i.e., by some
42 percent (Chart 14) •18 No significant rise occurred during the
first decade of the century, but an upward movement set in during
the second decade, particularly during the war years. Thus in 1919
the average haul stood at 309 miles, or 23 percent above the 1909
figure (251 miles). The ICC attributed the lengthened haul,
especially the marked increase after 1914, to "fundamental eco-
nomic changes, such as the development of the Western States,
Whenthe national ton-mileage total is divided by the total amount of
tonnage originated, an average haul figure is obtained for all carriers con-
sidered as a system. This should be distinguished from the (less significant)
average haul for individual railways obtained when the total of all tons carried
is used as a divisor. Changes in both averages reflect the impact of such eco-
nomic factors as the expansion of market areas and the shift in centers of
production and consumption, but the movement of the latter average reflects
also a slight tendency toward consolidation within the railroad industry, a
factor unrelated to the volume of rail output, which is our primary concern
here. Accordingly, we shall Center our attention on the movements of the
average haul for the rail network as a single system.
Length of haul for class I railroads, not available for years before 1911, is
slightly above the figure for all roads, being 370 miles in 1939. Data for origi-
nated tons were not collected prior to 1899; but, on the basis of tons carried,
average haul for all roads regarded as one system may be estimated at 225
miles in 1890.STEAM RAILROADS 87
growth of exports, and shifting of centers of production and con-
sumption."9
Chart 14
RAILROAD FREIGHT TRAFFIC: LENGTH OF HAUL












Source: Appendii Table C-3
The principal ways in which average haul may lengthen we
can safely group into three categories. First, greater dependence on
distant markets for the purchase of materials or the sale of a
product must have been rather generally experienced as the nation
spread across the continent and became more fully industrialized.
Second, some tendencies toward greater regional specialization led
to the rise of articles specifically designed for consumption in areas
Statisticsof Railways. 192!, p. XXXV. It may be noted that in the previous
year, the Commission had suggested that part of the increase in haul may have
been accounted for by the "extension of through billing," referring to the
possibility that originated tonnage totals are subject to duplication because
rebilled carloads may be reported as originating a second time. The elimination
of rebilling may have accounted for some increase in the average haul figure;
such a change does not of course reflect a real lengthening of the haul.
0
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remote from the point of production. This can be documented by
noting the growing traffic in certain commodities with long aver-
age hauls: citrus fruits (2,154 miles) and other fresh fruits (1,442
miles) and vegetables (1,744 miles), poultry (1,225 miles) and
eggs (1,353 miles)•20Third,diversion of short-haul traffic to truck
transportation will plainly lengthen the average haul of railroad
freight traffic.
To what extent can we distinguish statistically between these
three kinds of influence? We can test how far the lengthening of
the average haul for all commodities is associated with (1) a gen-
eral increase in the hauls of all or most commodities, or (2) a
shift in the composition of traffic in favor of those commodities
with long average hauls. This classification does not exactly fit the
categories of the preceding paragraph. Yet we would expect the
first influence (geographical widening of the market) to affect
short as well as long haul commodities, and so roughly to cor-
respond with (1). By contrast the second influence (growth of
commodities specially designed for distant markets) should be
reflected mainly under (2). Again, although transcontinental
truck lines are not unknown, mainly short haul traffic has been
lost to the highways. Such lost traffic could have included short
haul shipments of commodities with a wide dispersion of 'haul, or
representative shipments of commodities with a short average haul.
The former kind of shift would figure under (1), the latter under
(2) above. What we know of truck traffic suggests that the latter
may have outweighed the former.21
These considerations lead to the hypothesis that lengthening
of haul during the earlier part of our period was due primarily
to a general increase in the hauls of individual commodities, but
that this gave way to a lengthening from a shift in traffic com-
position as the period advanced. There is no real doubt that the
lengthening of haul in the first two decades of this century repre-
Hauls quoted are for 1932, the only year for which ton-mile data for indi-
vidual commodities have been collected. See Appendix Table C-i.
21Thatthe latter factor will explain cyclical changes in the average length of
haul, has been ingeniously demonstrated by Thor Hultgren, at least for recent
cycles ('Railway Freight Traffic in Prosperity and Depression', Occasional
Paper 5, NBER, 1942, pp. 40-43; American Transportation in Prosperity and
Depression, NBER, 1948, pp. 17-18).STEAM RAILROADS 89
sented a general increase in average distances most commodities
were hauled. The question is how the further lengthening of haul
during the third and fourth decades is to be explained.
Almost the whole of the increase in average haul since the close
of the first World War occurred during the decade 1929-39. Let
us therefore begin by comparing the terminal years of this decade.
If we apply the hauls observed in 1932 to the actual tonnage of
individual commodities originated in 1929 and in 1939,, we find
that the average haul for freight traffic as a whole would have
increased about 4 percent, even if the average haul for each of
the 157commodity classes had remained at the 1932 level through-
Table 22
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Less-than-carload traffi&' 436 436 ....
ALL COMMODITIES 326 339 +4
Observed
ACTUAL AVERAGE HAUL,
ALL COMMODITIES 334 370 +11
Class I roads only. Computed on the assumption that the average haul for
each of the 157 commodities distinguished in the statistics was the same, both
in 1929 and 1939, as in 1932. Thus the actual number of tons originated in
1929 (or 1939) were converted into ton-miles using the 1932 hauls, and the
ton-mileage totals so obtained were divided by the corresponding tons origi-
nated to yield the hypothetical hauls shown in the table. The changes resulting
reflect only shifts in the relative importance, measured in tons originated, of
different commodities.
bInthe official statistics less-than-carload traffic is treated as a single com-
modity. Consequently it is impossible to report the change in average haul (if
any) associated with shifts within this classification.90 CHAPTER 4
out the decade. This calculation gives us a measure of the increase
in haul associated with shifts in the character of railroad freight
traffic from short to long haul commodities (Table 22).
Amounts of tonnage originated were in general lower in 1939
than in 1929, and numerous changes occurred in the relative
importance of shipments of different types of freight. The greater
decline in the shipments of short- than of long-haul commodities
undoubtedly reflects, at least in good part, the unequal results of
motor truck competition. For example, the 12 percent lengthening
that would have occurred in the average haul of animals and prod-
ucts, even with constant hauls for individual commodities, reflects
a relative decline of live animal shipments (which have short hauls)
and a corresponding growth of shipments of meat and poultry
products (which have long hauls). We know that the movement
of livestock to market has shifted from the railroad to the highway
to a larger extent than any other form of traffic, except possibly,
less-than-carload freight. In the case of the other groups also, some
at least of the decline in the relative importance of short haul
traffic must be attributed to diversion from railroad to highway.
Obviously forest products form an exception to the general ten-
dency, for here traffic would have registered a slight decline in
average haul, had hauls for individual commodities remained
unchanged. Where other groups lost short haul, forest products
lost significant amounts of long haul traffic to other agencies.
In brief, something under one-half of the 11 percent rise which
actually occurred between 1929 and 1939 in average haul can
imputed, in the manner indicated, to shifts in the relative
importance of different commodities or commodity groups. But it
would be unsafe to regard this as even the roughest measure of the
degree to which short haul traffic has been lost to other transpor-
tation agencies. In the foregoing calculation we were able to take
account only of the effect of shifts between commodities. The
lengthening of haul not so accounted for, we must plainly impute
to longer hauls of individual commodities. Since 1932 is the only
year for which we can measure the haul commodityby commodity,
we have no means of discovering which items moved longer dis-STEAM RAILROADS 9
tances (on the average) and which did not. Nonetheless it is plain
that the average haul of a given commodity may lengthen, not only
through a general lengthening of the customary haul of individual
shipments, but also through the loss to rival agencies of short haul
traffic in that commodity.
We should also remember that we have no breakdown of less-
than-carload tonnage. This traffic is not of course a homogeneous
category from any viewpoint. It includes commodities drawn from
almost the entire freight classification, although less-than-carload
shipments are relatively high grade and long haul in nature in
comparison with the general run of carload traffic. Our knowledge
of the drastic losses to motor trucking suffered by the less-than-car-
load traffic of the railroads suggests that its average haul has
probably increased greatly.22
The presumption that the increase in average haul in recent
years is due in large measure to shifts in the composition of rail
traffic rather than to general expansion of market areas is further
strengthened by the fact that the method of Table 22, if applied
to the interval 1920-29, reveals a somewhat different picture. In
this period the average haul of all I freight increased from
327 miles to 334 miles, or just over 2 percent. Applying the known
1932 hauls to the tonnage originated in those commodity classes
in 1920 and 1929 which are comparable,23 we obtain average
hauls for all carload traffic that show a decrease of 1.2 percent.
Obviously the changes are too small to warrant definite conclusions
except of a negative sort. If a significant lengthening of haul
22Tonnage of less-than-carload traffic originated between 1929 and 1939
declined nearly 60 percent. How much of this decline represents a diversion of
traffic to other transportation agencies is difficult to determine, for it must
be attributed in part to the development of 'forwarding' agencies during the
'thirties. These agencies consolidate small shipments at various points into
full carloads to obtain carload rates, and usually also provide 'store-door'
delivery. While most forwarder shipments are carried by the railroads, motor
trucks and inland waterways are also employed by these agencies. See K. T.
Healy, Economics of Transportation (Ronald, 1940), p. 28.
ICC commodity classification was revised in 1928 to exhibit greater
but to retain comparability we had to use the cruder 1920 classification
for our 1920-29 comparison. The latter is therefore less precise than the
comparison, based on the more detailed classification, whose results
are reported in Table 22.92 CHAPTER 4
occurred during the 1920's it was a very small increase; nor can
it be explained by shifts in traffic composition.
To summarize, length of haul was about the same in 1914 as in
1899. Between 1914 and 1919 it increased This increase
appears to have been due to a widening of the market, perhaps
associated with industrial expansion during World War I. Between
1919 and 1929 average haul increased only slightly. The widening
of the market slowed down or came to an end, but appreciable
amounts of short haul traffic were not yet diverted to the highway.
Between 1929 and 1939 a further substantial ;.engthening of haul
occurred, due chiefly to loss of short haul traffic to competing.
agencies.
RAILROAD TRAFFIC AS A WHOLE
The measure of total railroad traffic (Table 17) required two
further steps. First, the indexes already constructed for freight and
passenger traffic respectively were combin&L Second, a small
adjustment was made for variations in coverage.
To combine freight and passenger output, vie used revenue per
ton-mile and per passenger-mile as weights in the Edgeworth
formula, changing the weights appropriately for each comparison.
The coverage of the completed index, which can. readily be assessed
in terms of revenue, varies slightly over the period. Accordingly a
small adjustment was made in order that the ;eries should consis-
tently represent the output of all line-haul rads and switching
and terminal companies, of the Pullman Company, and of the
Railway Express Agency, i.e., the entire steam railroad industry.24
As was to be expected, the index of total rail output (Table 17
24Fora detailed account of the procedure, see note a to Table 17. Previous
indexes of total rail output have been based on a fixed relationship between
the passenger-mile and ton-mile. Thus, Witt Bowden in 'Productivity, Hours,
and Compensation of Railroad Labor' (Monthly Labor Review, Dec. 1933,
pp. 1277-8) equated one revenue passenger-mile to 2.6 revenue ton-miles,
the latter figure representing the average ratio of receipts per passenger-mile
to receipts per ton-mile over the period 1916-32. For that period the change
in the ratio was not great enough (ranging from 2.9 lii 1916 to 2.1 in .1932)
to introduce any significant divergence between the Bow den index an.d our own.
The use of a fixed weight even for the entireperiod would not have
resulted in a wide divergence, mainly because of dominating influence
of the ton-mileage component.STEAM RAILROADS 93
arid Chart 10) does not diverge greatly from that of freight output,
its dominant component. One effect of the inclusion of passenger
traffic is to emphasize the element, of retardation. The pre-1940
peak in total rail output is seen to have occurred in 1926, three'
years prior to the peak in freight output. However, the 1926 level
is not significantly higher than the figure for total output attained
in 1920, when rail passenger travel had marked an all-time high.
Like its components, the total index shows rather clear retardation
of growth, at least during 1889-1939, and an all-time peak in 1944.
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY
In 1939 the railroad industry employed about one million persons.
Rail employment reached an alhtime peak in 1920, when class I
railroads alone employed over 2 million persons; thereafter a
decline set in that brought rail employment down to the level
obtaining at the turn of the century. Peak employment during
World War II, about 1.4 million, was still well below the level
of the 1920's.
Many different factors have influenced the draft made by
railroads upon the nation's labor force. First and foremost are
variations in rail output. Yet other factors have been important
also. Throughout railroad. history technology has scored note-
worthy advances. During our period the decline and practical
cessation of new railroad construction probably lessened the need
for labor in the 'way and structures' departments.25 Again, consoli-
dation of railroads, for instance in the combination of terminal
facilities, made for economies in labor. It is probable, too, that the
efficiency of the average railroad employee has varied, not only
through technological change, but for other reasons also. Apart
from the slow increase of education and formal training among
the general population from which railroad workers are recruited,
declining employment in the industry has led to the practice of
retaining men with the longest service. It has been argued that the
Although extensions of line practically ceased around 1915, intensive con-
struction continued; moreover it 'is possible that contractors were less used
than formerly. These reasons mitigated the net decline in' construction activity
by the railroads themselves.94
Chart 15
STEAM RAILROADS:
OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY
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application of the principle of seniority,endcrsed by both labor
and management, has raised the level of experience of the average
worker, and thereby also his competence.2° On the other hand it
frequentlyis alleged that restrictions by















Part 30, p. 16903.STEAM RAILROADS 95
'featherbed rules', have to some• extent lowered the worker's'
effectiveness.
The net outcome of these various influences was to leave the
number of workers in 1939 about the same as in 1899: but these
workers worked fewer hours27 and produced far more —about
twice as much —output.
This comparison conceals the fact that both output and employ-
ment rose to a peak during our period from which they then
declined; while the upward movement of output per worker,
although by no means perfectly steady, continued throughout the
four decades considered. In fact to say that output per worker
doubled is to understate the rise which has occurred in the pro-
ductivity of labor. In 1900 the railroads were still expanding. Not
only had they to be fully maintained; some employment was no
doubt concerned with adding to plant and equipment —additions
which of course nowhere appear in our measure of output. At the
end of our period, on the other hand, few new facilities were under
construction, and some track and equipment were candidates for
abandonment, perhaps inducing a temptation toward under-
maintenance. For these reasons, the indicated increase seems a
minimum estimate for the change in output per worker over four
decades.
Output per worker increased rather steadily at an average rate
of 1.9 percent per annum (Chart 15), compared with 2.2 percent
for transportation as a whole (Table 13 above).
Reasons have sometimes been advanced for anticipating a slack-
ening of the rate of productivity growth as the age of an industry
advances.28 Such might be the case if the rate of technological
change were slower, or the opportunities for technological advance
more restricted, in an old industry than in a young one. However,
the trend in output per worker, measured logarithmically, does not
vary significantly from a straight line. Output per worker in the
Data on average weekly hours in the railroad industry do not appear to
exist even for recent years. Average annual hours (computed from Appendix
Table B-i) declined from 3,100 in 1916 to 2,500 in 1921, and have since
fluctuated between 2,200 (in 1932-33) and 2,600 (in 1943-45).
Solomon Fabricant, 'Factory Employment and Output since 1899', Occa-
sional Paper 4,NBER, 1941).96 CHAPTER4
Table23
STEAM RAILROADS: OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT,
AND PRODUCTIVITY, 1890-1946
1929 :100
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Output Output
ComparableNumberOutputComparable Output
Calendar with of per with Man- per
Year Worker? WorkerManhour?hour?Manhour
1930 85.7 89.6 96 85.6 86.3 99
1931 69.2 75.9 91 69.0 69.6 99
1932 52.3 62.2 84 52.2 54.2 96
1933 55.0
59.7
58.7 94 54.9 50.8 108
1934 60.9 98 59.5 54.4 109
1935 62.6 60.3 104 62.3 54.4 115
1936 75.5 64.7 117 75.1 60.8 124
1937 80.8 67.8 119 63.6 126
1938 65.9 57.5 115 65.4 52.8 124
1939 74.8 60.4 124 74.2 56.3 132
1940 83.0 62.8 132 82.3 59.1 .139
1941 105.1 69.6 151 104.5 67.6 155
1942 146.2 77.4 189 146.8 77.2 190
1943 176.8 83.1 213 178.0 86.0 207
1944 182.7 87.6 209 183.3 89.9 204
1945 171.2 88.2 194 170.9 89.0 192
1946 144.3 84.9 170 142.2 81.0 176
a 1921-39,adjusted to cover class I, II, and III line-haul roads, switching and
terminal companies, the Pullman Company, and the Railway Express Agency.
Prior to 1921 we do not have employment data for switching and terminal
companies, and the Railway Express Agency (or its predecessor companies).
Therefore, for 1899-1921 the index here shown is adjusted only to include
class I, II, and III line-haul roads and the Pullman Company.
Comparisons 192 1-39 cover class I, II, and III line-haul roads, switching and
terminal companies, the Pullman Company and the Railway Express Agency.
Comparisons 1911-2 1 include class I, II, and III line-haul roads and the Pull-
man Company. Comparisons 1890-1911 are based on class!, II, and III line-
haul roads. For recent years data are mainly averages of monthly counts; for
earlier years, employment on June 30 (see note d to Appendix Table B-i).
Data relate to class I line-haul roads and the Pullman Company.
railroad industry does not appear to be subject to retardation —
atleast to the present time.
Manhour Productivity
For manhours, as distinct from number of workers, we have data
oniy since 1916. In that year the average workday was about ten
hours. It fell sharply as a result of the Adamson Act (1918) and
again during the 1930's. As a consequence output per manhour
increased considerably faster than output per worker (see Table 23
and Chart 16). On a 1916 base comparison may be made as
follows: .98 CHAPTER 4
Output per Output
Year Ending Worker Manhour
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Table 23 Ralio scale
THEAMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT
We have seen that output increased more rapidly than employ-
ment. We should like to examine also the relation between output
and the amount of capital used by the railroads. In any compre-
hensive sense the latter is difficult to measure, and we shall content
ourselves by noticing some changes in the amount and capacity of
movable equipment employed.
The stock of equipment units (locomotives, passenger cars, and
freight cars) weighted by the average cost of each type was larger
in 1920 thanin 1903 (earlier data are not available), but in 1939
and 1946 had fallen back almost to the level at the opening of theSTEAM RAILROADS 99
century (Table 24). The number of equipment units, that is to
say, changed in roughly the same fashion as employment. Output
per equipment unit rose with roughly the same speed as output per
worker. Evidently the equipment became more efficient in pro-
ducing transportation, although it still needed about the same
amount of manpower to operate each unit. Locomotives are
known to have more powerful, and freight cars to have
larger capacities than formerly; we have no record of any change
in the size of passenger cars (although they now offer greater
comfort).
Let us approximately allow for these changes by measuring the
Table 24
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Output Passenger & freight
traffic combined 100.0187.6235.1229.9172.0331.8
Number of equipment units
(weighted)" 100.0142.8148.3140.3102.1105.4
Output per equipment unit 100131 159164168315
Aggregate equipment capacity
•(weighted)° 100.0192.8213.0226.2178.4191.7
Output ÷ equipment capacity100 97 110102 96 173
Number of workers 100.0126.3158.5128.977.8109.4
Equipment units per worker 100113 94 109 131 96
Equipmentcapacityperworker100153 134175229 175
Output per worker 100149 148178221303
* Datacover all line-haul and switching and terminal companies. For indexes
of output and employment, see Table 23; figures for the number and capacity
of equipment units come from general summaries in the Statistics of Railways.
"Index represents numbers of locomotives ($17,321), passenger cars ($7,883),
and freight cars ($973), weighted by the unit values in parentheses. These unit
values are the average cost of equipment owned on June 30, 1916 shown in
ICC valuation reports for the following roads: Pennsylvania, New York Cen-
tral, Southern, Santa Fe, New Haven, Northern Pacific, Chesapeake and Ohio,
Burlington, and Boston and Maine.
Index represents aggregate locomotive tractive effort ($.535 per lb.), number
of passenger cars ($7,883), and aggregate freight car capacity ($24.0 per ton),
weighted by the unit values in parentheses. For source of unit values see note b.100 CHAPTER 4
locomotive stock by its aggregate tractive power and of freight
cars by their aggregate capacity; passenger cars we shall measure
as before by number. The resulting index of capacity (instead of
units) of equipment roughly doubled during the period. By and
large the same amount of labor is needed to operate a large as a
small piece of equipment. In fact the doubling of equipment, in
terms of capacity, compares with a threefold expansion of output
and also of output per worker. We may say therefore that larger
equipment contributed to the growth in output per worker and
per manhour, but does not completely account for this growth.
To be sure, more powerful locomotives could pull heavier trains;
but, as we shall see in the next section, many other technological
changes, unconnected with capacity of equipment, also helped to
save labor.
CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY AND THEIR EFFECTS
Among factors influencing the amount of labor required to pro-
duce a unit of railroad output, changes in technology obviously
rank high. I shall first discuss some cases where the influence of
such changes upon particular branches of railroad employment
can be traced, and then take up the question of railroad tech-
nology from a more general standpoint.
Table 25 shows percentage changes in the number of railroad
workers by seven broad divisions. The decline from 1923 to 1939
was especially marked in maintenance personnel. Thus, in the
period 1923-39 losses in maintenance employment were of the
order of 53 percent, as compared with 40 percent for transporta-
tion service employees and administrative personnel. This could
indicate either that technological displacement affected mainte-
nance employment most severely, or that the industry as a whole
has been characterized by undermaintenance.
During 1923-29 employment declined nearly 11 percent. Ad-
ministrative employment suffered least.; indeed, the number of
executives, officials, and staff assistants increased slightly. Profes-
sional, clerical and general employment, however, declined by 5.9
percent, perhaps reflecting the extended use in this period of office
machines —atrend characteristic of all business activity. In theSTEAM RAILROADS 101
railroad industry the introduction of office machinery has been
closely connected with the trend toward office centralization.29
Table 25





(thousand) 1929 1939 1939
Passenger and Freight Traffic .
Combined .... +2.8—25.8—23.7
Total Employment 1,858 —10.6 —40.5W—46.8
Administrative Personnel, total 299 —5.4—38.1—41.5
Executives, Officials, staff
assistants, etc. 16 +3.8—29.7—27.0
Professional, clerical and general282 —5.9—38.7—42.3
Maintenance Personnel, total 983 —12.8—45.6—52.6
Way and structures 398 +2.2—50.4—49.3
Equipment and stores 585 —23.0—41.4—54.8
Transportation Service, total 576 —9.6—33.4—39.8
Other than train, engine and yard213 —9.4—35.4—41.5
Yardmasters, switch tenders,
and hostlers 26 —17.8—42.2—52.5
Train and engine service 337 —9.1—31.6—37.8
a ClassI line haul roads.
Maintenance employment, as we have indicated, declined most.
The drop of 13 percent in the period 1923-29 is to be attributed
to declines in the employment of men charged with the ,mainte-
nance of equipment and stores. The number of men engaged in
the maintenance of way and structures increased somewhat, reflect-
ing.in part the nature of railway investment in this'period. While
relatively little 'new mileage was added to the rail network in the
'twenties, there was a considerable amount of construction activity,
In testimony before the Temporary National Economic Committee in 1940,
Mr. George Harrison, president of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, com-
mented on this point as follows: "The machine could nOt be utilized under
the old method. When the machine was introduced it was necessary to central-
ize the work, and so the work has been removed from many offices along the
railroad line and consolidated and centralized in, ordinarily, the headquarters
or general office building of the railroad." See TNEC, Hearings, Part 30,
p. 16613.[02 CHAPTER 4
reflected in increased employment in maintenance of way and
structures.3° Some transcontinental mileage was double-tracked;
also additional yard track and sidings were built, terminal, facili-
ties were extended, and considerable sums were spent on the relo-
cation or improvement of existing trackage.3' To some extent
heavier equipment and faster speeds made higher standards of
maintenance necessary.
Among the technological improvements on which maintenance
employees were engaged in the 'twenties were the laying of
heavier rails, the introduction of chemically treated ties, and the
use of improved ballast and tie-plates. In large part, this activity
rcduced future maintenance requirements, as indicated rather viv-
idly by the fact that such employment was cut .in half in
thelatter decline may have
been due to more or less deliberate undermaintenance rather
than technological displacement. Most of the technological
advances associated with the 41 percent decline in employment
on the maintenance of equipment and stores in the period 1929-39
were designed to increase the running time of locomotives and can
in relation to time and labor required for service repairs. This
was accomplished by the application of metallurgical advances to
locomotive construction, the adoption of cast-steel frames integral
with the cylinders, the chemical treatment of locomotive water
supply, better lubrication, the gradual introduction of roller bear-
ings, and the introduction of longer-lived, rust-resisting steel cars.
In addition, in the railroad shops very considerable savings of
labor were accomplished by the introduction of such modern
Most such construction doubtless was undertaken by contractors, yet some
additions and betterments probably were built by railroad maintenance em-
ployees. Whether built by contract or not, subsequent responsibility for main-
tenance fell upon railroad employees.
Among western roads to which sections of second main track were added may
be mentioned: the Union Pacific in Idaho and Wyoming between 1917 and
1922.; the Santa Fe in New Mexico, Arizona and California in 1923; and the
Southern Pacific across the Sierra Nevada in 1926. After 1930, not only did
traffic decline, but construction of second track was rendered less necessary,
for the development of centralized traffic contra! allowed the capacity of busy
sections of single track to be increased sharply. Since 1930 construction has
been practically confined to the relocation of existing trackage, to the reduction
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machine tool apparatus as multiple planers, improved drill presses,
and tapping machines, and by the more efficient use of the
assembly line system for locomotive and car repair.32
Some: of the same technological advances that have reduced the
need for maintenance have also displaced employees. in the train
and engine service; for example, the advent of the modern loco-
motive which requires less servicing and has higher tractive power.
The more significant advances affecting employees engaged in
transportation service, however, are those relating to dispatching,
communications, freight handling, etc. The installation of auto-
matic block signal devices facilitating the automatic control of
train movements has been one of the most significant innovations
in rail transportation technique.
Among employees performing transportation service, the small
group comprising yardmasters, switch tenders and hostlers has
contracted most sharply since 1923. Many of these workers have
been displaced through the progressive mechanization of switch-
ing operations. 'Hump yards' have a long history, but their further
elaboration in recent years has significantly affected the employ-
ment of this class of rail worker. Here must be included the cen-
tralized control of switching operations and the general introduc-
tion of car-retarding devices.
SOME TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
Looking back over the past half century we can see that railroad
technology has undergone numerous changes. It is not easy to
summarize these changes briefly; still less easy is it to indicate
accurately either the contribution to efficiency each has made or
the degree to which each has become standard practice.
Most of the instances of technological advance we shall be
able to cite can be brought within one or another of the following
four broad categories: changes in design and organization that
have taken place rather gradually and have merged into each
other; economies of scale; rather straightforward instances of
mechanization; and applications of chemical and metallurgical
Cf. Redesign of the C.C.C. St. L. shops at Beech Grove and the New
Haven shops at Readville (Railway Age, Oct. 27, 1923, pp. 767-70).104 CHAPTER 4
discoveries, most of which originated in other industries. The
sources of changes in railroad technology aretherefore exceedingly
diverse: some developments depend upon true inventions, of a
kind potentially subject to patent rights; others are related rather
to the mere passage of time, the growth of traffic, or the accumu-
lation of experience both within and without the industry.
Instead of attempting to classify these changes directly along the
lines just indicated, however, it is perhaps more convenient to
adopt a functional approach, and to consider separately, first, the
operation and maintenance of rolling stock; second, the mainte-
nance of track and other fixed equipment; and third, the general
organization and operation of the railroad undertaking as a whole.
Of these the first —theapplication of power to the movement of
passengers and freight —hasundergone by far the most dramatic,
and probably also the most quantitatively significant, series of
changes.
Rolling Stock
Despite the gradual introduction of Diesel power, first for switch-
ing and later for main line work, at the end of our period the steam
locomotive still remained by far the most important source of
motive power.sa But the steam locomotive itself had changed.
Larger and more powerful units have rendered possible economies
of scale through hauling longer and heavier trains —economies
both of fuel and labor. The average tractive effort of all steam
locomotives in service rose from 20,000 pounds in 1902 to 36,000
pounds in 1920 and 54,000 pounds in It has been claimed
that over a period of twenty years or so weight per horsepower was
cut in half and thermal efficiency doubled: this statement of
The distribution of available equipment in terms of tractive effort at the
end of 1946 was: steam, 87.2 percent; electric, 2.1 percent; Diesel electric,
10.7 percent. Since the average utilization of Diesel power is more intensive
than steam, these figures understate Diesel performance in terms of car-miles
or ton-miles.
Tractive effort is a theoretical measure of pulling power based on boiler
pressure and cylinder and driving wheel dimensions. The mean tractive effort
of all locomotives (including electric and Diesel) did not differ appreciably
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course applies to locomotives available for replacement, not to the
locomotive stock owned by the railroads at the two dates.35
Such, economies represent more than the mere result of doing
things in a bigger way. The increase in tractive effort has been
associated with a long series of innovations, most notable of which
are the superheater, the feed-water heater, the force-feed lubri-
cator, the mechanical stoker, and power reverse gear. Some of
these —especiallythe superheater and the feed-water heater —
havealso contributed economies in fuel consumption. All may be
said to date from the period since 1899, and collectively they have
made possible the large modern main line power plant.
While in most respects progress in design and the adoption of
improvements in the steam locomotive have followed a continuous
line of development, the history of compounding forms an inter-
esting exception. There is no doubt that fuel consumption may be
reduced through the multiple-expansion principle —byusing the
expansive properties of steam more than once in a series of cylin-
ders: the universal use of compounding in the practice of marine
reciprocating engines is sufficient evidence of this. In fact com-
pound locomotives were introduced in the late 1880's, and by 1900
appeared to many likely to become standard practice in this
country for main-line work. From about 1910, however, a rever-
sion to the two-, three- or four-cylinder single expansion locomotive
began. By the 1920's even articulated locomotives, traditionally
built as compounds, were being designed for single expansion.
The rise and subsequent decline of compounding offers an inter-
esting example of an innovation promising large economies,
especially in fuel consumption and boiler repairs, that almqst
became standard practice, then virtually disappeared from the
scene. For the eclipse of the compound locomotive no entirely
convincing explanation is forthcoming, but it appears to have been
connected with the elaboration and more extended use of super-
heating. The compounds of forty years ago used saturated steam
and realized undoubted economies, especially in fuel and water
consumption. But similar economies are available through the use
National Resources Committee, Tethnological Trends and National Policy
(l937),p.192.ro6 CHAPTER 4
of superheated steam in a single set of cylinders by cutting off the
supply of steam at a very early stage of the piston stroke. The
expansibility of saturated steam is insufficient to allow of this: but
if the steam is superheated it will continue expanding long after it
is no longer being admitted to the cylinders. Consequently, if the
steam is superheated, less of it is required per piston stroke. In
theory no doubt, these economies should be cumulative, and one
might regard the superheated compound locomotive as the acme
of efficiency. In practice it appears that the effect of superheating
—nowalmost universal —hasbeen to supplant compounding
rather than to be combined with it. Insofar as the two devices are
regarded as alternatives by designers, it is easy to see why super-
heating should have been preferred, for unlike compounding it
requires no additional moving parts. Higher boiler pressures —300
instead of 200 pounds per square inch —alsoappear to have
favored the superheater over the compound engine. Other dis-
advantages of compounding were high maintenance costs, and the
excessive size to which the low pressure cylinders grew in a non-
articulated compound locomotive as its capacity was increased.
•While therefore the steam engine has undergone very marked
improvement in recent decades, and while it is still the principal
form of motive power on the railroads, two newcomers should be
mentioned —theelectric locomotive and the Diesel engine. Elec-
trification has so far been confined to areas of high density traffic
or where peculiar operating conditions, such as tunnels (New
York terminals of the Pennsylvania and New York Central) or
sharp grades (Norfolk and Western), occur combined with dense
traffic. Capital cost of equipment is high and, although fuel econ-
omies are marked, main line electrification has made little progress
in this country. Diesel power was first introduced in the 1920's for
switching and for the operation of rail motorcars. At first trans-
mission difficulties limited power output; soon electrical transmis-
sions, though expensive, removed this restriction. In 1934 the
Burlington and the Union Pacific introduced Diesels for main
line passenger work, and thereafter their use spread both for
passenger and freight operation. Principal advantages are the easeSTEAM RAILROADS 107
with which several units can be combined, the long runs possible.
between stops .for servicing, and the reduced wear on the track at
high speeds due to the absence of heavy reciprocating parts.
Higher speeds and heavier trains —especiallylarge-capacity
freight cars —havebeen only partially offset by the use of alumi-
num and of metallurgical discoveries which lighten the weight of
steel. While modern alloys have played a dramatic role in the
advent of the streamlined passenger train, traveling at high speeds,
often with Diesel power, the high cost of the new metals has pre-
vented their use to date for ordinary freight car construction. Poten-
tial reduction in the weight of rolling stock through the use of the
newerbut still more expensive —methodsof construction is
undoubtedly large, but has yet to be realized.36
Improvements in the maintenance and servicing of rolling stock
have been no less considerable, if less dramatic, than in the equip-
ment itself. The chemical treatment of feed water and the sludge
remover have diminished the frequency with which boilers must
be washed out and lengthened their life. Mechanical coaling
equipment and conveyors for removing cinders have reduced the
labor involved in servicing. Improved brakes and draft gear have
lengthened the time between repairs; while within the last ten
years better lubricants (as well as better-designed bearings and
other factors) have cut sharply the risk of contracting a hot box.37
Meantime technological developments in railroad repair shops
have paralleled changes in machine shop practice elsewhere —for
example in the general use of welding, of spraying machinery for
painting, and in improvements in plant layout. Repairs have been
concentrated in fewer and larger plants.88 Partly through the less
Z8Cf.Evidence of J. H. Parmelee, TNEC,Hearings,Part 30, pp. 16602-3.
On the Milwaukee the frequency of reported hot boxes was as follows:
THOUSAND MILES HOT BOX
1929 1940
Freightcars 128 462
Passenger cars 242 1,166
(President'sEmergency Board, 1941, 'Hearings', mimeo, p. 1975.)
Cf.the concentration of repair work on the Delaware and Hudson in 191 1-12
from Carbondale, Oneonta and Green Island to Colonie near Albany (A Cen-
tury of Progress: History of the Delaware and. Hudson Company, 1823-7923,
J. B. Lyon, Albany, 1925, pp. 362-3). On the Pennsylvania between 1920io8 CHAPTER 4
frequent need of repairs, partly through shortening a locomotive's
stay in the shops, the proportion undergoing repair has been
reduced 30
Trackand Fixed Equipment
Rather striking improvements have been made in the maintenance
of track and fixed equipment. The burden placed upon those con-
cerned with permanent way has of course increased through
heavier and faster trains: these have necessitated heavier rail,4°
strengthened bridges and relocated tracks. However, the reduction
of grades and elimination of curves involved in the relocation of
track have made for operating economies, while the installation of
automatic highway crossing signals and the elimination of grade
crossings have reduced the need for watchmen. In the maintenance
of existing track —acontinuous operation that must be carried
on year in, year outsubstantial improvements have also been
effected. As recently as the early 1920's less than half of all replace-
ment ties were chemically treated: treated ties, which may last
three times as long as untreated, now comprise more than four-
fifths of all ties laid.41 The use of longer rails and the heat treat-
ment of rail ends to withstand battering also decrease the need
for maintenance. Finally in the actual operations of relaying track
and replacing ballast a high degree of mechanization has been
achieved.42
and 1934 locomotive repair shops were reduced from 26 to 3, passenger car
shops from 12 to 3, and freight car shops from 16 to 11 (George H. Burgess
and M. C. Kennedy, Centennial History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany, P.R.R., 1949, p. 597).
Cf. Charles B. Going, Methods of the Santa Fe (The Engineering Magazine,
1909), pp. 57-8; Henry S. Haines, Efficient Railway Operation (Macmillan,
1919), pp. 63, 73. See also evidence of J. H. Parmelee, TNEC, Hearings,
Part 30, pp. 16601-2.
Onclass I roads the average weight of rail per yard of main track rose from
82 pounds in 1920 to 95 pounds in 1939 and 99 pounds in 1946. The percent-
age of all track with rail heavier than 100 pounds per yard rose from 13 percent
in 1920 to 50 percent in 1946, (Statistics of Railways).
TNEC, Hearings, Part 30, p. 16563; President's Emergency Board, p. 1903;
P. Harvey Middleton, Railways and the Equipment and Supply Industry,
(Railway Business Association, Chicago, 1940), pp. 18-9.
Cf. TNEC, Hearings, Part 30, pp. 16594-1660 1. Power machinery is avail-
able for adzing ties, drilling rails, tightening bolts, driving and pulling spikes,
and cleaning ballast (President's Emergency Board, p. 1977). Rail laying, tie
renewal, ballast work, and ditching have been largely taken away from regular
section gangs and given to gangs specially mechanized for these purposes.STEAM RAILROADS 109
General Operation and Maintenance -
Asin the case of equipment and track, in the field of general
operation and maintenance the railroads have partly borrowed
from the experience of other industries and partly developed
specialized devices to meet their own peculiar problems. In
accounting and office routine they have shared in developments
that mainly originated elsewhere; and the same might be said of
the improvement of communications but for the very special role
played by the telegraph and telephone in railroad operation. The
transmission of information concerning train movements was
indeed one of the earliest applications of electrical communication.
The installation of block signal systems, designed to enforce a space
interval between trains, was primarily a contribution to safety.
It belongs, as do the first interlocking machines, to the very begin-
fling of our period. The function of interlocking is of course to
harmonize the movements of signals and switches and to prevent
the giving of contradictory indications. In their original form these
inventions were purely mechanical in character, although operated
in conjunction with the electric telegraph. Before long, however,
electricity was applied to block signaling itself. First, from about
1879, the track circuit began to be used in conjunction with inter-
locking. Human operation of signals and switches still was neces-
sary, but it could now be made physically impossible to direct
traffic onto a section of track already occupied. Second, fully
automatic block signaling, already widely adopted for main line
operation. by about 1910, was due originally to city subway prac-
tice.43 Now for the first time the signals were directly controlled by
the trains themselves. During the 1920's fully automatic interlock-
ing plants to protect crossings began to be installed.44 Finally,
where manually operated signaling remains indispensable —asat
junctions and terminalsswitchesand signals alike may be
remotely controlled over great distances. Closely allied and some-
times combined with these developments must be mentioned
centralized traffic control. It consists in directing from a single
point all traffic movements over a wide area of railroad territory
43Onthe introduction of automatic blpck signaling, see Railway Age) March
20, 1903, pp. 536-8 and Jan. 15, 1909; pp. 118-9.
"Cf. Railway Age., Dec. 12, 1931, pp. 890-2.110 CHAPTER 4
and eliminates the ordinary business of dispatching by means of
train orders. That is to say, train movements are directed entirely
by signal indication, the signals being operated from a central
point, so that operators at way stations are eliminated. Train move-
ments are reported on an indicator board which may cover thirty,
forty or more miles of track; all switches and signals are controlled
from a single desk. The function of CTC is not only to eliminate
local control of signals (from towers or otherwise), but also enor-
mously to enlarge the elasticity of the time table by rerouting and
rearranging traffic at a central headquarters to suit the conditions
of the moment. By increasing the effective capacity of equipment
and track, CTC has produced large economies in many cases.
Perfected originally on eastern roads with dense traffic, it has been
applied even to such single-track sectors as those of the Missouri
Pacific, Denver and Rio Grande Western, and Southern Pacific:
in the last case it is said to have increased track capacity by as
much as 50 percent.45 Perhaps the most notable installation to
date is that consisting of four sections of the Union Pacific aggre-
gating some 600 miles between Los Angeles and Salt Lake City.
Yet CTC is fairly expensive to install and in 1942 was used to
control only about 3,000 miles or perhaps 1 '/2percentof all main
track.
TECHNOLOGY AND OUTPUT PER WORKER
Enough has been said to show that technological changes on the
railroads are numerous and diverse, and that they have a complex
history. Accurately to date the general introduction of any individ-
ual innovation is difficult; to appraise quantitatively its labor-
saving value would require elaborate and specialized study. Yet
the combined influence of these many changes (not all of which
are here listed) conditioned the rise in output per worker and per
manhour (Chart 16).
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the upward trend of
labor productivity in the railroad industry is its continuity and
persistence. The average technological situation in such an industry
as the railroads, the representative way of doing things, changes
"Fortune, June, 1942; see also Railway Age, Sept. 12, 1931, pp. 388-90.STEAM RAILROADS III
only slowly. Sharp rises in output per worker, or its relative stagna-
tion for a few years, must be traced to varying degrees of utilization
of working force and fixed equipment, or to short term variations
in maintenance activity. The steadiness and persistence of the
influence of technological change, as evidenced by the practically
linear movement of output per worker (measured on a ratio scale)•
over more than half a century can be attributed to two character-
istics. In the first place, most innovations are themselves gradual
in nature. Modern Diesel power or the hump classification yard as
we know it today —topick two instances —eachembody numer-
ous features successively introduced over a time span of several
decades. In the second place the introduction into general practice
even of a perfected and seasoned improvement must inevitably be
a gradual affair. Not only must the idea be sold to many separate
managements; often its introduction must await replacement.
Continuous rail or treated ties may be worth installing, but only
if replacement is anyhow in prospect.
Such considerations go far to explain the continuity of the
upward trend of productivity; they do not explain the lack of
evidence of any slackening of growth. Why the rate of technological
change in the railroad industry —orat least of its measurable
effects —shouldvary so little from decade to decade poses an
interesting problem for the solution of which little evidence is at
hand.